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Abstract
For a given, arbitrary graph, what is the epidemic threshold? That is, under what conditions
will a virus result in an epidemic? We provide the super-model theorem, which generalizes
older results in two important, orthogonal dimensions. The theorem shows that (a) for a wide
range of virus propagation models (VPM) that include all virus propagation models in standard
literature (say, [8][5]), and (b) for any contact graph, the answer always depends on the first
eigenvalue of the connectivity matrix. We give the proof of the theorem, arithmetic examples
for popular VPMs, like flu (SIS), mumps (SIR), SIRS and more. We also show the implications
of our discovery: easy (although sometimes counter-intuitive) answers to ‘what-if’ questions;
easier design and evaluation of immunization policies, and significantly faster agent-based
simulations.
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1 Introduction - Preliminaries
Given a social or computer network, where the links represent who has the potential to infect
whom, can we tell whether a virus will create an epidemic, as opposed to quickly becoming
extinct? This is a fundamental question in epidemiology; intuitively, the answer should depend
on (a) the graph connectivity and (b) the virus propagation model (VPM). This threshold is the
minimum level of virulence to prevent a virus from dying out quickly [14].
No result till now has unified the varied observations on the effect of different network struc-
tures on the way different diseases spread. Moreover, with the exception of our earlier work on
the SIS model [4] and its follow-up [6]; no other analysis examines arbitrary-topology graphs:
the overwhelming majority of work focuses either on full-clique topologies (everybody contacts
everybody else), or on ‘homogeneous’ graphs [12, 13], or on power-law graphs [18] or hierar-
chical (near-block-diagonal) topologies [9] (people within a community contact all others in this
community, with a few cross-community contacts).
We show that, irrespective of the virus propagation model, the effect of the underlying topol-
ogy can be captured by just one parameter: the first eigenvalue λ1 of the adjacency matrix A.
In particular we cover all models given in the standard survey by Hethcote [8], which includes
models like SIS (no immunity, like flu - ‘susceptible, infected, susceptible’) and SIR (life-time im-
munity, like mumps: ‘susceptible, infected, recovered’). We also include numerous other cases
like SIRS [5] (temporary immunity), our own useful generalizations SIV (vigilance/vaccination
with temporary immunity) and SEIV (vigilance/vaccination with temporary immunity and virus
incubation) and many more. A few of these models are shown in Figure 1, organized in a lattice.
Informally, our result can be stated as:
Informal Theorem 1. For any virus propagation model (VPM) in the published literature, operating
on an underlying undirected contact-network of any arbitrary topology with adjacency matrix A, the epi-
demic threshold depends only on the first eigenvalue
λ1
of A and some constant CVPM that is determined by the virus propagation model.
Next, we give some preliminary definitions and in the upcoming sections, state our main re-
sult together with its application on a select few standard models and its potential uses (Section 2
and Section 3) and finally give simulation results to illustrate the super-model theorem and dis-
cuss some of its implications (Section 5). The proof roadmap is explained in Section 4 with a
description of the general model while the complete proof is presented in the Appendix.
1.1 Preliminaries
Table 1 and Table 2 list common terminology and describe some of the epidemic models we will
be using in our article. Specific mathematical symbols and notations used for proofs are described
in Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows the generalization hierarchy for some common epidemic models. The brown
colored nodes denote standard VPMs found in literature while the blue colored nodes denote
our generalizations. Each VPM is a generalization of all the models below it e.g. SIV is a gen-
eralization of SIRS, SIR and SIS. Our main generalization, S*I2V*, is described in detail later in
Section 4.1.
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Figure 1: Virus Propagation model hierarchy (actually, lattice) for some standard models in-
cluding SIRS (temporary immunity), SIV (vigilance, i.e., pro-active vaccination); SEIV (in-
cludes the ‘exposed but not infectious’ state, and temporary vigilance); MSEIR (with the pas-
sive immune state M); and our main generalization S*I2V*. The brown colored nodes denote
standard VPMs found in literature while the blue colored nodes denote our generalizations.
Each VPM is a generalization of all the models below it.
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Table 1: Common Terminology
VPM virus-propagation model
NLDS non-linear discrete-time dynamical system
β attack/transmission probability over a contact-link
δ healing probability once infected
γ immunization-loss probability once recovered (in SIRS) or vigilant (in
SIV, SEIV)
 virus-maturation probability once exposed - hence, 1 −  is the virus-
incubation probability
θ direct-immunization probability when susceptible
A adjacency matrix of the underlying undirected contact-network
N number of nodes in the network
λ1 largest (in magnitude) eigenvalue of A
s effective strength of a epidemic model on a graph with adjacency matrix
A
Table 2: Some Virus Propagation Models (VPMs)
SIS ‘susceptible, infected, susceptible’ VPM - no immunity, like flu
SIR ‘susceptible, infected, recovered’ VPM - life-time immunity, like mumps
SIRS VPM with temporary immunity
SIV ‘susceptible, infected, vigilant’ VPM - immunization/vigilance with tem-
porary immunity
SEIR ‘susceptible, exposed, infected, recovered’ VPM - life-time immunity and
virus incubation
SEIV VPM with vigilance/immunization with temporary immunity and virus
incubation
2 Main Result
The tipping point for each of the models captures a fundamental transition in the behavior of the
system between the two extremes: a network-wide epidemic, versus a minor local disturbance
that fizzles out quickly. We use the typical definition of the threshold used in literature [4, 8, 2, 6].
Intuitively, below threshold the virus has no realistic chance of spreading the infection while
above threshold the virus can take over and create an epidemic. For the SIS model, the tipping
point describes some maximum strength of a virus, that will guarantee no epidemic [4, 8]. We
define strength a little later (see Equation 2). Similarly for the SIR model, the tipping point relates
the explosiveness of the infection phase w.r.t. the virus strength, since in this model the virus will
become extinct.
In order to standardize the discussion of threshold results, we cast the threshold problem as
expressing the normalized effective strength of a virus as a function of the particular propagation
model and the particular underlying contact-network. So we are ‘above threshold’ when the
effective strength s > 1, ‘under threshold’ when s < 1 and the threshold or the tipping point is
reached when s = 1.
Intuitively, the effective strength s can be thought of as the basic reproduction number R0 [8]
frequently used in epidemiology. The effective strength is roughly the generalized R0 for the
virus model and an arbitrary graph and is the quantity which determines the tipping point of an
infection over a contact-network.
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Formally, our main result is:
Theorem 1 (Super-model theorem - sufficient condition for stability). For virus propagation models
which satisfy our general initial assumptions (see Section 4.1) and for any arbitrary undirected graph with
adjacency matrix A and largest eigenvalue λ1, the sufficient condition for stability is given by:
s < 1 (1)
where, s (the effective strength) is:
s = λ1 · CVPM (2)
andCVPM is a constant dependent on the virus propagation model (given by Equation 30 in the Appendix).
Hence, the tipping point is reached when s = 1.
2.1 Two, Orthogonal Generalizations
Our result generalizes along two different, difficult directions: (a) arbitrary contact-network
topologies and (b) several virus propagation models (VPMs).
2.1.1 General Topologies
Much of previous work [1] has concentrated on the analysis of VPMs on specific types of contact-
networks, typically cliques or homogeneous graphs. We include them all, as special cases. Specif-
ically
• Cliques, where every node contacts every other node. In that case, our result gives λ1 = N,
where N is the number of nodes in the graph
• Homogenous graphs, with fixed degree d and random Erdös-Rényi graphs with expected
degree d (e.g. see [12, 13]). In all these cases we have λ1 = d, and our theorem includes the
previous results.
• Hierarchical (i.e., near-block-diagonal), e.g. [9].
• Power-law (e.g. [18])
Theorem 1 provides a simple and natural generalization of these results to arbitrary graphs.
For example, previous results [18] have shown that the epidemic threshold in case of scale-free
(power-law) networks is vanishingly small as the size N of the network increases. This is a
corollary of our theorem: When a power-law graph grows (N → ∞), the largest eigenvalue
grows with the highest degree, which also grows infinity, and thus the threshold approaches
zero.
2.1.2 General VPMs
We also generalize with respect to various VPMs which satisfy our very general assumptions (see
Section 4.1). We refer to our generalized model as S*I2V*, because it has an arbitrary number of
susceptible states, two infectious/infected states, and an arbitrary number of vigilant/vaccinated
(= recovered) states. All the standard models (like see [8],[5]) are simply special cases of S*I2V*:
• the typical flu model, SIS, is a special case.
• the typical mumps model, SIR, which corresponds to permanent immunity, is a special case,
with one state for each class - S belongs to the Susceptible class, I belongs to the Infected
class and R belongs to the Vigilant class.
• the SIRS model (temporary immunity), similar to the SIR model
• the SEIRS model ([8], page 601) where the virus has an incubation period (state ’E’: exposed,
but not infectious), and all other ingredients of the SIRS model (temporary immunity).
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and more like SIV, SEIV, MSEIV etc. which generalize some specific models. The generalization
hierarchy is shown in Figure 1. We elaborate more on the above in Section 4.2.
We now give a brief summary of our threshold results (Table 3) by applying Theorem 1 on
some standard epidemic models. Note the effect of the contact-network in effective strength for
each model is captured solely by one parameter, λ1 the first eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix
of the network. Again, our result is a general one and these models just highlight the ready
applicability of the result to standard VPMs in use.
Table 3: Threshold results for some models.
Model Effective Strength (s) Threshold (tipping point)
SIS λ1·
(
β
δ
)
s = 1
SIR λ1·
(
β
δ
)
SIRS λ1·
(
β
δ
)
SIV λ1·
(
βγ
δ(γ+θ)
)
SEIR λ1·
(
β
δ
)
SEIV λ1·
(
βγ
δ(γ+θ)
)
SI1I2V1V2 (used to model the H.I.V.
virus, e.g. see [1])
λ1·
(
β1v2+β2
v2(+v1)
)
3 Applications
The results in this article can be fundamental to numerous applications. We describe a few im-
portant ones next.
3.1 Fast answers to “what-if” questions and guiding policy
The threshold results can help quickly determine the result of plausible situations. For exam-
ple, what happens if the virus is twice as infectious (virulent)? Similarly, what happens when
there is a weaker strain of the virus? Our results will help in determining whether there is a
danger of the infection taking-off or not. Naturally then this can feed into policy decisions for
controlling epidemics. Assuming some models for the underlying contact network (like scale-
free, small-world, hierarchical etc.) we can estimate which nodes/classes should be quarantined
or immunized first. Given the linear dependence on λ1, we want to immunize nodes (and hence
remove them from the contact graph) which will drop the λ1 value the most so that the resultant
infection becomes below threshold and dies out. For example, they may decide to immunize
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teachers and kindergarten children first to control the epidemic. In addition, they can impose re-
strictions on travel so as to not increase the λ1 and hence the effective strength for the virus. The
above discussion also illustrates the generality of our result. Policy makers can assume any graph
model which captures the contact behavior of the population the best and still use our threshold
result to guide policy.
A lot of work has been done to show that immunizing high-degree nodes in scale-free net-
works is a good idea because of the vanishing threshold result [18]. But significantly, just con-
centrating on high-degree nodes will miss those low-degree nodes which are good “bridges”
and hence can have a important influence on decreasing λ1 when immunized. Intuitively, how
disparate the groups are to which a node connects is also important in addition to how many
groups one is connected to. For example, a single common friend of only some sportspeople and
movie stars can have a huge impact in the outbreak of a disease even if he/she knows only a few
sportspeople and movie stars (while sportspeople and movie stars are themselves very tightly
connected).
We have been concentrating on biological viruses only. But various biological virus models
have been used to model computer viruses as well [14] e.g. [7] introduced the SHIR model (’sus-
ceptible’, ’hidden’, ’infected’, ’recoverable’) to model computers under email attack. More so
than the biological cases, it is easier to get the entire underlying network. Hence our threshold
results can be precisely used to make the network more robust to malware and computer viruses
by selectively “removing” nodes from the contact-network by immunizing them like installing a
firewall on them etc.
3.2 Simplifying epidemiological simulations
Epidemiological simulations in general have several parameters and are computationally expen-
sive to run. By distilling the impact of the network topology and also giving the exact threshold,
we can greatly simplify these efforts. For example, parameters which do not affect the effective
strength of the contagion need not be varied. In addition, regular topologies like cliques, block-
diagonal matrices lend themselves to fast eigenvalue computations. This can be taken advantage
of to quickly identify parameter spaces where simulations would be useful.
3.3 Viral Marketing
A variety of dynamic processes on graphs are modeled like epidemic spreading. In contrast to
the biological viruses, conversely, we may actually want the spread of a contagion as quickly as
possible in some situations e.g. spread of a product or idea in a network of individuals. The
Bass model [3] fits product adoption data using parameters for pricing and marketing effects
ignoring topology and hence assuming that all adopters have equal probability of influencing
non-adopters. A more refined picture using our result can be constructed of when a product
gains massive adoption on a network (equivalent to an “epidemic”). Marketers can also then
decide which target groups should the product be more marketed to and how aggressive should
the marketing be for an estimated network of individuals.
3.4 Software patch distribution and more
Another application is efficient spreading of software patches over a computer network. The
patches behave like computer worms [19] and can help defend against other malicious worms.
We want to maximize the spreading of the patch over the network. Given full knowledge of the
router-network involved, we can estimate how “aggressive” the patch-worm (say by increasing
the number of probes for possible hosts before dying out) has to be to initiate an “epidemic”. Our
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threshold results can also help determine the “vulnerability” and hence consequently the cost of
not patching a part of the network say after one wave to “worm-patching”.
Various epidemic models have also been used to model blog cascades. These models can be
now applied to arbitrary graphs e.g. study propagation of memes through blogs [15].
4 Proof Roadmap
The first basic idea behind the proof is approximating the epidemiological models by a discrete
time non-linear dynamical system (NLDS). A NLDS can be represented by
P˜t+1 = g(P˜t)
where g is some non-linear function operating on a vector. We define the vector P˜t such that it
specifies the state of the system at time t; the exact definition will differ from model to model
but it effectively encodes the probability of each node in the graph of being in any given state at
time t. An equilibrium point (also called a fixed point) of the NLDS is the state vector (i.e. some
particular P˜) of the NLDS which does not change. Thus at the equilibrium point P˜t+1 = P˜t = x˜.
Formulating a NLDS helps us in leveraging the vast results in NLDS literature. In particular,
Theorem 2 (given in Appendix B) gives the conditions when an equilibrium point a NLDS is
stable (Figure 2 illustrates this concept). It relates the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the NLDS at
the equilibrium point with the stability of the NLDS at that point.
(A) Unstable (B) Stable (C) Neutral (at threshold)
Figure 2: Different types of equilibria for a discrete-time NLDS: Unstable, Stable and Neutral.
The equilibrium is neutral at threshold.
Intuitively, the tipping point for any model then deals with analyzing the stability of the
corresponding NLDS at the point when none of the nodes in the graph are infected, because
otherwise the infection can still spread. If the equilibrium is unstable, a small “perturbation”
(physically in the form of a few initial nodes getting infected) will push the system further away
which physically means more and more nodes will get infected leading to an epidemic. But if the
equilibrium is stable, the system will try to come back to the fixed point without going “too-far”
away in effect, “controlling the damage”. At threshold, the tendencies to go further away and
come-back will be the same. In other words, the equilibrium is stable below the threshold and is
neutral at the tipping point.
The requirement imposed by Theorem 2 on the eigenvalues of the ‘Jacobian’ of the corre-
sponding NLDS for any virus propagation model eventually reduces to a simple condition on
the eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. This condition translates into the effective strength of the
virus under the model. The reason we can reduce the condition to one on the adjacency matrix is
due to the special structure of the models, which is explained next.
4.1 General Model
Suppose the virus-propagation model has m states (e.g. m = 3 for the SIR model with states S, I
and R) and it operates on a graph ofN nodes. Consider then am ·N×1 vector P˜t which captures
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S1 S2 . . .
‘Susceptible’
I1 I2 . . .
‘Infected’
V1 V2 . . .
‘Vigilant’
Exogenous Transitions
(depends on neighbors)
Endogenous
Transitions
Endogenous
Transitions
Endogenous
Transitions
Figure 3: General State Diagram for a node in the graph - it is not a simple Markov chain. In
essence, there are only three types of state ‘classes’ - Susceptible, Infected and Vigilant. Only
cross-class transitions have been shown. Note the unidirectional arrow from Infected to Vigi-
lant. Only one type of transition is exogenous i.e. graph-based (red curvy arrow) affected only
by the neighbors of the node, all other transitions shown are endogenous. Any transitions
between the states of the same class are also endogenous. The red arrow always ends at I1,
i.e. any state in the Infected class can cause a graph-based transition from any state in the
Susceptible class only to the I1 state.
the probability of each node being in any ofm states at a given time t. Specifically:
P˜t =

Ps1,1,t
Ps1,2,t
...
Ps1,N,t
Ps2,1,t
...
Psm,N,t

(3)
where, Psj,i,t = the probability of node i being in state sj at time t. This vector completely defines
the system at time t and our NLDS equation will track the evolution of this vector across time.
Every epidemic model will have some fundamental states and the choice of which states to
include in a model depends on the particular disease characteristics [8]. In fact, every model can
be essentially thought of having states in any of the following broad classes (see Figure 3):
Susceptible Class: Nodes in any of the states in this class signify that it (the individual) is sus-
ceptible and can get infected by any neighboring node in a state of the Infected class.
Infected Class: In a state of this class, the node is infectious in the sense that it is capable of trans-
mitting the infection to its neighbors. Note that each such state will have a transmissibility
parameter (e.g. β in the SIR model for the infectious state I). This definition is general
enough to accommodate models with states which have their transmissibility parameter =
0 i.e. they are ‘exposed’ but not infectious (e.g. the E state in the SEIR model is a state which
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is in the Infected class in the sense that it can potentially cause infections but is not by itself
infectious).
Vigilant/Vaccinated Class: This class contains states which are not in either of the other two
classes Susceptible and Infected. Nodes in any of the states in this class can not get infected
nor do can they potentially cause infections. States like M (called as the passive immune
state which feeds to the susceptible state), R (the recovered/died state where the node either
gets permanent immunity or dies and hence doesn’t participate in the epidemic further) etc.
are all conceptually of the Vigilant type. Notice that importantly by definition, any state in
the Vigilant class will not have a direct transition to any state in the Infected class. This is so
because otherwise that state can be potentially infectious and thus is not part of the Vigilant
class.
Apart from the types of states, models also fundamentally have only two types of transitions:
Exogenous (graph-based, in particular affected only by the neighbors) and Endogenous (caused by
the node itself by some probability at every time step). For example, the transition from S to I
in the SIRS model is an exogenous transition while the transition from R to S is an endogenous
transition. It is the presence of the graph-based transitions that makes our model not a simple
Markov chain and brings in the topology of the graph into play. In our general model note that
only one class of transitions is graph-based, all others are endogenous transitions. The exogenous
transitions are the ones that take a node from a state in the Susceptible class to the Infected class.
In addition we assume any such exogenous transition ends at the I1 state; but these transitions
will themselves be caused by some neighbor node in any of the states of the Infected class.
Assumption 1 (Transition Assumption 1). The only way to get infected is through your neighbors i.e.
there is no path to a state in the Infected class from a state in the Susceptible class composed solely of
endogenous transitions.
Assumption 2 (Transition Assumption 2). Any exogenous (graph-based) transition always results in
a transition from a state in the Susceptible class to the I1 state.
As seen from a single node, these models will look like in Figure 3. It gives the general
state diagram for a node in the graph together with the assumptions on the transitions discussed
above. We have shown only cross-class transitions and their types. All transitions between states
of the same class are of course endogenous.
4.2 Examples
Our general characterization is powerful enough to seamlessly capture all the practical mod-
els like SIS, SIR, SIRS, SIV, SEIR, SERIS, MSIR, MSEIR etc. [8] while still being mathematically
tractable to yield simple threshold equations.
S E
I
V
β
θ
γ

δ
Figure 4: Transition diagram for the SEIV model.
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We give one instantiation of our general model in the form of the SEIV model, which itself
generalizes several known VPMs (see Figure 1). SEIV has one state (S) in the Susceptible class,
two (E and I) in the Infected class and one (V) state in the Vigilant class. The transition diagram
for the SEIV model in shown in Figure 4. Note the similarities in Figures 3 and 4 e.g. E state is
the I1 state of Figure 3. The infection is caused only by the I state and the E is only a latent state.
The SEIR, SEIRS, SIRS, SIV, SIR and SIS models are all special cases of SEIV:
• SIS, is a special case, with  = 1,γ = 1, θ = 0.
• SIR, which corresponds to permanent immunity, with  = 1,γ = 0, θ = 0.
• SIRS (temporary immunity), similar to the SIR model, with  = 1, θ = 0.
• SIV, our own model, where ’V’ stands for vigilant or vaccinated, with  = 1.
• SEIR, similar to SIR but where the virus has an incubation period, with γ = 0, θ = 0.
• SEIRS where the virus has an incubation period, and all other ingredients of the SIRS model,
with θ = 0.
The complete proof for the general model with two states in the infected class (we call this as the
S*I2V*generalized model) is given in the Appendix. The proof follows the following roadmap:
1. We develop the system equations of our general NLDS in Appendix B.
2. The relevant fixed point is computed in Appendix C.
3. The Jacobian at the fixed point is constructed in Appendix D.
4. Finally we prove Theorem 1 by finding the condition to bound the eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian in Appendix E and Appendix F.
5 Discussion
We discuss some simulation examples for our threshold in some models and a few direct impli-
cations of the super-model theorem in this section. We also illustrate what the result implies for
the ‘vulnerability’ of the underlying contact graph for epidemics. Apart from the dependence of
the threshold on λ1, it is instructive to note some unexpected results in specific models as well.
5.1 Simulation Examples
We conducted some computer simulation experiments on the Oregon AS router graph1 to illus-
trate our super-model theorem. Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 give an overview of the simulations for the
SIR, SEIR, SIRS and SEIV models. All values are average over several runs of the simulations.
In short, as expected from the theorem, the difference in behavior above, below and at threshold
can be distinctly seen for each of these models.
Figures 5(A), 6(A), 7(A) and 8(A) show a time-evolution plot of the fraction of infected nodes
in the graph for different values of the effective strength of the virus specifically above threshold (in
red) and under threshold (in green). Note the qualitative difference in the behavior of the system
above and below the threshold.
Figure 5(A) and Figure 6(A) deal with SIR and SEIR which don’t have a steady state because
of the recovered state. The number of susceptibles available in the graph decrease with each new
infection and hence epidemics will disappear unlike in models like SIS and SIRS. Additionally
as a result, above the threshold, the number of infections has an explosive phase and then they
go down to zero while in the SIRS and SEIV models (see Figures 7(A) and 8(A)) the number of
infections reach a steady state value. Contrast this with the under threshold behavior, where in
all the models the number of infections aggresively go down to zero.
1This is a real network graph collected from the Oregon router views. It contains 15,420 links among 3,995 AS peers.
More information can be found from http://topology.eecs.umich.edu/data.html.
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(A) SIR Infective Fraction Time Plot (log-log) (B) SIR Footprint vs Strength (lin-log)
Figure 5: SIR (all values averages over several runs): (A) Plot of Infective Fraction of Pop-
ulation vs Time (log-log). Note the qualitative difference in behavior under and above the
threshold. (B) Plot of Final number of cured nodes (the footprint) vs Effective Strength (lin-
log). Note the tipping point is exactly when the effective strength s = 1.
(A) SEIR Infective Fraction Time Plot (log-log) (B) SEIR Footprint vs Strength (lin-log)
Figure 6: SEIR (all values averages over several runs): (A) Plot of Infective Fraction of Popula-
tion vs Time (log-log). Note the qualitative difference in behavior under and above the thresh-
old. Also notice the initial “silent” period for above threshold because of virus-incubation.
(B) Plot of Final number of cured nodes (the footprint) vs Effective Strength (lin-log). Note
the tipping point is exactly when the effective strength s = 1.
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(A) SIRS Infective Fraction Time Plot (log-log) (B) SIRS Max. Infections till steady
state vs Strength (lin-log)
Figure 7: SIRS (all values averages over several runs): (A) Plot of Infective Fraction of Pop-
ulation vs Time (log-log). Note the qualitative difference in behavior under and above the
threshold. (B) Plot of Max. number of infected nodes till steady state vs Effective Strength
(lin-log). Note the tipping point is exactly when the effective strength s = 1.
(A) SEIV Infective Fraction Time Plot (log-log) (B) SEIV Max. Infections till steady
state vs Strength (lin-log)
Figure 8: SEIV (all values averages over several runs): (A) Plot of Infective Fraction of Popula-
tion vs Time (log-log). Note the qualitative difference in behavior under and above the thresh-
old. Also notice the initial “silent” period for above threshold because of virus-incubation.
(B) Plot of Max. number of infected nodes till steady state vs Effective Strength (lin-log). Note
the tipping point is exactly when the effective strength s = 1.
13
Also note the initial “flat” period in the time plots for above threshold for the models having
the Exposed (E) state, SEIR and SEIV. This is due to the virus-incubation period because of which
there is an initial delay in number of infected nodes. This then results in an initial “silent” period
after which the epidemic takes-off. As there is no such incubation period in SIR and SIRS, their
plots do not show such silent periods.
We also give a “take-off” plot for each model ((Figures 5(B), 6(B), 7(B) and 8(B)). They show
the final number of cured nodes (for SIR and SEIR) and max. number of infections till steady
state (for SIRS and SEIV) vs the different strengths of the virus. Intuitively, these metrics measure
the “footprint” of each infection. If the infection resulted in an epidemic then the footprint will
be large. As our theorem predicted, the plots clearly illustrate that the tipping point in all the
cases is at the point when the effective strength s = 1.
5.2 λ1: Measure of Connectivity
(A) Chain (λ1 = 1.73) (B) Star (λ1 = 2) (C) Clique (λ1 = 4)
Figure 9: Changing connectivity and vulnerability of graphs with changing λ1. Our result says
that a virus has the most effective strength in a clique, star and chain, in that order. Thus the
Clique is the most vulnerable.
What does exactly the result mean w.r.t. the graph? Intuitively, λ1 (also known as the spectral
radius) of a graph captures the connectivity of the graph. The preceding threshold results show
that this is precisely what matters in the epidemic threshold. Hence, more connected the graph
is, more vulnerable it is to an epidemic by a virus. For example, see Figure 9. It shows three
graphs with the same number of nodes in increasing λ1 value. Note that although the star and
chain (Figure 9 (A) and (B)) have the same number of edges, the star has a higher λ1 value, thus
boosting the effective strength s of a virus making the graph more vulnerable to epidemics. Also,
recall that a d-regular graph (a homogeneous graph with all nodes of same degree d) has λ1 = d.
Hence, we can make the following observation:
Observation 1 (Impact of λ1). Our threshold results suggest that an arbitrary graph behaves in the same
way to a λ1-regular graph. In other words, λ1 captures the average neighborhood for a node in the graph.
Notice that the actual dynamics of the epidemic may not be captured by λ1 completely, but
the threshold is solely dependent on the λ1 (apart from the VPM).
5.3 Insensitivity to Virus Incubation
For the SEIV model which is similar to SIV, except for the E state, we have the following:
Observation 2 (SEIV). The threshold here does not depend on the virus-maturation probability  i.e. the
probability of transition from Exposed to Infected.
This implies that the incubation period of the virus does not have an effect for purposes of
the epidemic threshold. The parameter , in effect, only delays/speeds-up the achievement of
the threshold, not what the threshold itself is. As an example, this is also illustrated in Figure 10
for the standard SEIR model [8] (it is also one of the special cases of our SEIV generalization).
It shows the final number of cured nodes (the ‘footprint’) of computer simulations of the entire
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Figure 10: Changing  in the SEIR model on the AS graph (lin-log scale). Note that it does
not affect the threshold (the tipping point is still at effective strength λ1β
δ
= 1). All values are
averages over multiple runs.
virus infection as a function of the effective strength of the virus (λ1β/δ) on the AS graph. Note
that the tipping point is the same for all the three colored curves which correspond to different
values of .
5.4 Confirming “Prevention is better than cure”
Clearly SIV is the most general model assuming no intermediate Exposed state and comprising
three states (see Figure 1). We know its effective strength (Table 3) is:
s = λ1 ·
(
βγ
δ(γ+ θ)
)
By setting γ, θ etc. to zero we can get different models such as SIRS, SIR, SIS and so on. For
example, when we set θ = 0, the model reduces to SIRS, where the threshold we know is λ1β/δ.
This generalization gives us further insight:
Observation 3 (Rate of loss of immunity). Lowering the rate of loss of immunity i.e. having a smaller
γ (say due to better hygiene) decreases the effective strength s (and makes it harder for the virus to cause
an epidemic) only so long as there is a mechanism to give a node direct immunity i.e. having a non-zero
θ (say by using a vaccine) before an infection (in the Susceptible state) instead of after (in the Recovered
state).
Satisfyingly, this fits well with the old adage ‘Prevention is better than Cure’. This can also be
vividly seen specifically in the case of SIRS (θ = 0):
Observation 4 (SIRS). The threshold in SIRS does not depend on γ, the immunity-loss rate, that is, the
probability of becoming Susceptible again from the Recovered state.
Figure 11 demonstrates this on the AS graph. Again, the tipping point does not depend on γ,
it is the same for all the three colored curves. This means that the rate of lapse or loss of immunity
to a virus is immaterial to the threshold here.
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Figure 11: Changing γ in the SIRS model on the AS graph (lin-log scale). Note that it does
not affect the threshold (the tipping point is still at effective strength λ1β
δ
= 1). All values are
averages over multiple runs.
6 Conclusion
In this article we provided two, orthogonal generalizations of earlier epidemic threshold results.
• In the first direction, our result gives the threshold of the generalized S*I2V* model, which
encompasses any epidemic model in published literature ([8] [5] etc.).
• In the second direction, topology, we showed that for any, arbitrary, undirected contact-
network, the effect of the topology can be captured solely by λ1, the first eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix.
We also demonstrated simulation results which illustrate our result. In addition, we discussed
some important applications and implications of our result for policy makers, scientists etc. like:
• Fast answers to “what-if” questions.
• Guiding immunization policies.
• Simplifying epidemiological simulations.
• Modeling Viral Marketing, Software patch distribution, Blog propagation etc.
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Appendix
A Notation
Recall that we are dealing with the S*I2V* generalized model - it has two states I1 and I2 in the
Infected class. To simplify notation, we refer to state I1 as E (the ‘infection entrance state’) and
I2 as the I state in the proofs. The state E has a transmission probability of β1 and the state I has
a transmission probability of β2. The states E and I here should be thought as to mean general
infected states of our model and not in the sense of the specific E and I states in epidemic models
like SEIR, SEIV etc. We also refer to the exogenous transitions as graph-based and endogenous
transitions as internal interchangeably. Table 4 gives some of the notation we will be using in our
description of the proof.
Table 4: Notation and Symbols used in proofs
m total number of states in the model
q total number of states in the Susceptible and Vigilant classes of the model;
hencem = q+ 2
w total number of states in the Susceptible class of the model
S1,S2, . . . ,Sw general states in the Susceptible class
E, I general states in the Infected class
αKU probability (constant and given) of transition from state K to state U
β1 transmission probability for state E
β2 transmission probability for state I
ζi,t(E, I) probability that a node i does not receive any infections from E and I at
time t
x˜ the fixed point vector our NLDS corresponding to when no node is in any
of the Infected class states
p∗Sy (same for each node) probability of being present in the Sy state at x˜
J Jacobian matrix of the NLDS computed at x˜
B System Equations
We can develop the system equations i.e. explicitly specify the non-linear function g for the
NLDS based on the transition diagram of the model. As stated earlier in Section 4.1 we assume
that infections are received only from infected neighbors i.e. those in states E and I the Infected
class of states. Firstly, let’s calculate the probability that a node i does not receive any infections
in the next time step (call it ζi,t(E, I), E, I denotes that an infection is passed only from a neighbor
in the E or I states). No infections are transmitted if:
• Either a neighbor is not any of the infected states E and I
• Or it is in state E and the transmission fails with probability 1 − β1
• Or it is in state I and the transmission fails with probability 1 − β2
Since we assume infinitesimally small time steps (∆t → 0), multiple events can be ignored for
first-order effects in the time step. Also, assuming the neighbors are independent, we get:
ζi,t(E, I) =
∏
j∈NE(i)
(PE,j,t(1 − β1) + PI,j,t(1 − β2) + (1 − PE,j,t − PI,j,t))
=
∏
j∈{1..N}
(1 − Ai,j(β1PE,j,t + β2PI,j,t)) (4)
18
where NE(i) is the set of neighbors of node i in the graph.
Also, the sum of probabilities of being in all the possible states for each node i should equal
1. Hence,
∀i,t
∑
K
PK,i,t = 1 (5)
We can now write down the system equations as follows. A node i will be in any particular
state Sy of the Susceptible class at time t+ 1 if:
• Either it was in Sy at time t and stayed in state Sy i.e. it did not receive any infections from
its neighbors and it did not change state internally from Sy to any other state
• Or it was in some other state U and changed state internally from U to Sy
Hence, the probability of node i being in Sy where Sy is any state in the Susceptible class at
time t+ 1 is:
∀y = 1, 2, . . . ,w PSy,i,t+1 =
∑
K 6=Sy
αKSyPK,i,t + PSy,i,t
ζi,t(E, I) − ∑
K 6=E,Sy,I
αSyK
 (6)
Similarly, for the E state:
PE,i,t+1 =
∑
K 6=S1,S2,...,Sw
αKEPK,i,t +
w∑
y=1
PSy,i,t (1 − ζi,t(E, I)) (7)
and for any other state U 6= {S1,S2, . . . ,Sw,E}:
PU,i,t+1 =
∑
K
αKUPK,i,t (8)
As discussed earlier (Equation 3), we can now define a probability vector P˜t by “stacking” all
these probabilities which will completely describe the system at any time t and evolve according
to the above equations. Note that the above equations are non-linear and naturally define the
function g for the NLDS P˜t+1 = g(P˜t).
We have the following theorem about NLDS stability at a fixed point:
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic Stability, e.g. see [10]). The system given by P˜t+1 = g(P˜t) is asymptotically
stable at an equilibrium point P˜ = x˜, if the eigenvalues of J = 5g(x˜) are less than 1 in absolute value,
where,
Ji,j = [5g(x˜)]i,j =
∂gi
∂gj
|P˜=x˜
Hence, next we compute the fixed point we are interested in and the Jacobian of our NLDS at
that point.
C Fixed point
We are interested in the stability of the equilibrium point (i.e. where P˜t+1 = P˜t(= x˜)) of the NLDS
which corresponds to when no one is infected. Only the transition from the Susceptible class
states towards the Infected class states are graph-based (and can happen only when at least one
of the nodes is in any of the Infected states), so the state-diagram for each node will be a simple
Markov chain (call it MCSV ) consisting of the Susceptible and Vigilant states (see Figure 12).
Note now there are no graph-based effects, hence each node is independent of others and will
converge to steady state probabilities corresponding to the Markov chain. The steady state vector
pi∗ (size q× 1, where q is the number of states in the Susceptible and Vigilant classes) which will
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S1 S2 . . .
‘Susceptible’
V1 V2 . . .
‘Vigilant’
Endogenous
Transitions
Figure 12: State Diagram for any node in the graph at the fixed point when no node is present
in a state in the Infected class. Only cross-class edges are shown. Note that it is now a simple
Markov chain with a unique steady state probability.
be the same for each node can be computed from the following equations from standard Markov
chain analysis:
pi∗T TranMCSV = pi
∗ &
q∑
i=1
pi∗i = 1 (9)
Hence pi∗ is a probability vector and is the left eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1 of
the stochastic matrix TranMCSV of the Markov chain MCSV . The full (m × 1) probability vector
p˜∗ for each node at this steady state will have the entries in pi∗ for states in the Susceptible and
Vigilant classes and 0 for all states in the Infected class. The fixed point of the global original
NLDS x˜ can be finally represented as:
x˜ =

p˜∗
p˜∗
...
p˜∗
 (10)
where p˜∗ is repeated N times (once for each node in the graph). Let p∗Sy be the steady state
probability value in the vector p˜∗ corresponding to the Sy state. In other words, each node will
have a probability of p∗S of being present in the Sy state at the fixed point. Also define,
p∗S =
w∑
y=1
p∗Sy (11)
i.e. p∗S is the total probability of each node at the fixed point of being present in any of the states
of the Susceptible class.
D The Jacobian
We know from Theorem 2 that x˜ is stable if the eigenvalues of J = 5g(x˜) are less than 1 in
absolute value. From the definition of J we can see that it is a m ·N ×m ·N matrix with m (for
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each state) square blocks of size N×N each (corresponding to every node in the graph). We can
calculate J to be (states have been mentioned on the top and side for ease of exposition and I is
the identity matrix of size N×N):
Sy K . . . E I
Sy (1 −
∑
K 6=Sy,E αSyK)I αKSyI . . . αESyI− p
∗
Sy
β1A αISyI− p∗Sβ2A
...
. . .
U αSyUI αKUI . . . αEUI αIUI
...
. . .
E αSyEI αKEI . . . αEEI+ p∗Sβ1A αIEI+ p∗Sβ2A
I αSyII αKII . . . αEII αIII
where K is any state 6= {E, I} and U is any state 6= {S1,S2, . . . ,Sw,E, I}.
Recall the properties we are assuming for the epidemic models discussed in Section 4.1 (also
see Figure 3). Crucially, they imply ∀K 6=E,I αKE = 0 and ∀K 6=E,I αKI = 0. Hence J reduces to:
Sy K . . . E I
Sy (1 −
∑
K 6=Sy,E αSyK)I αKSyI . . . αESyI− p
∗
Sy
β1A αISyI− p∗Sβ2A
...
. . .
U αSyUI αKUI . . . αEUI αIUI
...
. . .
E 0N,N 0N,N . . . αEEI+ p∗Sβ1A αIEI+ p∗Sβ2A
I 0N,N 0N,N . . . αEII αIII
where 0N,N is a N×Nmatrix with all zeros.
E Eigenvalues of the Jacobian
Note that J is very structured and can be written as:
J =
[
B1 B2
02N,(m−2)N B3
]
(12)
where B1, B2 and B3 are matrices of size (m − 2)N × (m − 2)N, (m − 2)N × 2N and 2N × 2N
respectively. B3 corresponds to the E and I rows and columns of J i.e.:
B3 =
[
αEEI+ p∗Sβ1A αIEI+ p∗Sβ2A
αEII αIII
]
(13)
B1 and B2 are defined similarly. Consider any eigenvector v˜ (size mN × 1) and corresponding
eigenvalue λJ of J. We can write v˜ as being composed of vector v˜1 of size (m−2)N×1 and vector
v˜2 of size 2N× 1 i.e:
v˜ =
[
v˜1
v˜2
]
(14)
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Also x˜ and λJ satisfy the eigenvalue equation:
Jv˜ = λJv˜ (15)
Substituting from Equations 12 and 14 we get:[
B1 B2
0 B3
] [
v˜1
v˜2
]
= λJ
[
v˜1
v˜2
]
(16)
Equation 16 implies the following the two relations:
B1v˜1 + B2v˜2 = λJv˜1 (17)
B3v˜2 = λJv˜2 (18)
From Equation 18 we can infer that precisely one of the following holds:
1. v˜2 = 0˜
2. v˜2 is the eigenvector of B3 (and consequently λJ is the matching eigenvalue of B3)
If v˜2 = 0˜, Equation 17 reduces to
B1v˜1 = λJv˜1
wherein again, either v˜1 = 0˜ or λJ is an eigenvalue of B1. The condition v˜1 = 0˜ is not meaningful
as then v˜ = 0˜ (v˜ is an eigenvector of J implies v˜ is non-zero). Therefore the eigenvalues of J are
given by the eigenvalues of B1 (with v˜2 = 0˜) and the eigenvalues of B3.
E.1 Eigenvalues of B1
From the expression for J derived in Section D, note that:
B1 = T⊗ I (19)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product of two matrices and
T =

(1 −
∑
K 6=Sy,E αSyK) αKSy . . .
...
...
...
αSyU αKU . . .
...
. . .
...
 (20)
We know from matrix algebra [11] that if C = D⊗E then Cλ = Dλ⊗Eλ, where Cλ denotes a diag-
onal matrix with eigenvalues of the matrix C on the diagonal. But Iλ = I, hence the eigenvalues
of B1 are the same as the eigenvalues of T (although with repetition). In other words, eigenvalues
of T are eigenvalues of J as well.
E.2 Eigenvalues of B3
Let u˜ =
[
u˜1
u˜2
]
be a corresponding eigenvector of B3 (u˜1 and u˜2 are of size N × 1 each and as
the eigenvalues of B3 are also eigenvalues of J, we use λJ for an eigenvalue of B3). Hence, the
standard eigenvalue relation B3u˜ = λJu˜ requires the following equations to be satisfied:
(αEEI+ p∗Sβ1A)u˜1 + (αIEI+ p∗Sβ2A)u˜2 = λJu˜1 (21)
αEIu˜1 + αIIu˜2 = λJu˜2 (22)
22
Using Equation 22, we can compute u˜1 in terms of u˜2 as:
u˜1 =
(
λJ − αII
αEI
)
u˜2 (23)
Substituting it back into Equation 21 we get:(
(αEEI+ p∗Sβ1A)
(
λJ − αII
αEI
)
+ αIEI+ p∗Sβ2A
)
u˜2 = λJ
(
λJ − αII
αEI
)
u˜2
⇒ (αEE(λJ − αII)I+ αIEαEII+ (p∗Sβ1(λJ − αII) + p∗Sβ2αEI)A) u˜2 = λJ(λJ − αII)u˜2
which finally gives,
Au˜2 =
(
λ2J − (αII + αEE)λJ + αIIαEE − αIEαEI
p∗Sβ1(λJ − αII) + p
∗
Sβ2αEI
)
u˜2 (24)
Again, Equation 24 tells us that either u˜2 = 0˜ or it is an eigenvector for A. But u˜2 = 0˜⇒ u˜1 =
0˜ ⇒ u˜ = 0˜ which is not possible. Thus Equation 24 is an eigenvalue equation for the adjacency
matrix A and we are looking for solutions λJ and u˜2 such that they satisfy it. Hence,
λA =
λ2J − (αII + αEE)λJ + αIIαEE − αIEαEI
p∗Sβ1(λJ − αII) + p
∗
Sβ2αEI
where λA is an eigenvalue of A. This finally gives
λ2J − λJ(αEE + αII + p
∗
Sβ1λA) + (αIIαEE − αIEαEI + p
∗
SλA(β1αII − β2αEI)) = 0 (25)
Thus we have a different quadratic equation (Q.E.) for each eigenvalue λA of A. Each Q.E. gives
us two eigenvalues (possibly repeated) of J.
So, finally, we can conclude the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Eigenvalues of J). Eigenvalues of J are given by the eigenvalues of T (Equations 19 and 20)
and the roots of the Q.Es given by Equation 25 for each eigenvalue λA of A.
F Stability
We require that all the eigenvalues of J to be less than 1 in absolute value (according to Theo-
rem 2). From Lemma 1, we have two cases to handle in enforcing this:
(C1) All the eigenvalues of T should be less than 1 in absolute value
(C2) All the roots of the Q.Es given by Equation 25 for each eigenvalue λA of A should be less
than 1 in absolute value
F.1 Case C1
Note that this case depends only on the model as the matrix T is independent of the adjacency
matrix A. But T is a stochastic matrix i.e. all the column sums are equal to 1 - consequently all its
eigenvalues are less than 1 in absolute value.
Lemma 2 (Stability C1). All eigenvalues of the matrix T (given by Equation 20) are less than 1 in
absolute value.
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F.2 Case C2
As C1 is always true, we need to only ensure case C2. We can prove here the following:
Lemma 3 (Stability C2). All the roots of the Q.Es given by Equation 25 for each eigenvalue λA of A are
less than 1 in absolute value if:
λ1p
∗
S
(
β1(1 − αII) + β2αEI
(1 − αII)(1 − αEE) − αIEαEI
)
< 1
Proof Let r1 and r2 be the roots of Equation 25 (r1 and r2 can be real or complex depending on
λA). Then we want
|r1| < 1 and |r2| < 1
r1 and r2 are real As the roots are real, λA is such that the discriminant D of the quadratic
equation is greater than zero. In this situation:
|r1| < 1 and |r2| < 1⇒ r1 ∈ (−1, 1) and r2 ∈ (−1, 1) (26)
From the theory of quadratic equations, it is well known (see e.g. [17]) that for real roots x1
and x2 of a Q.E. f(x) = ax2 + bx + c (with a > 0) to lie in the interval (−1, 1) the following
conditions must be true:
a− c > 0,
a− b+ c > 0,
a+ b+ c > 0.
Intuitively, the first condition forces the product of the roots to be less than 1 while the last two
conditions state that value of f(x) at −1 and 1 should not be “too small”. In our case, these then
translate into:
αIIαEE − αIEαEI + p
∗
SλA(β1αII − β2αEI) < 1 (27a)
1 + αEE + αII + p∗Sβ1λA + αIIαEE − αIEαEI + p
∗
SλA(β1αII − β2αEI) > 0 (27b)
1 − αEE − αII − p∗Sβ1λA + αIIαEE − αIEαEI + p
∗
SλA(β1αII − β2αEI) > 0 (27c)
Equations 27b and 27c can be written as:
λAp
∗
S
(
−β1(1 + αII) + β2αEI
(1 + αII)(1 + αEE) − αIEαEI
)
< 1 (28a)
λAp
∗
S
(
β1(1 − αII) + β2αEI
(1 − αII)(1 − αEE) − αIEαEI
)
< 1 (28b)
respectively. The above equations should be true for any eigenvalue λA of A which makes D > 0.
Recall that we are considering only undirected graphs, hence A is a symmetric binary (0/1)
square irreducible matrix. As a result firstly, all its eigenvalues are real. Secondly, from the
Perron-Frobenius theorem [16] the algebraically largest eigenvalue λ1 of A is a positive real num-
ber and also has the largest magnitude among all eigenvalues. Hence if the above equations are
true for λA = λ1 we are done. Now note that
(1 + αII)(1 + αEE) − αIEαEI > (1 − αII)(1 − αEE) − αIEαEI
and that
β1(1 − αII) + β2αEI > −β1(1 + αII) + β2αEI
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In addition the L.H.S in both equations is positive under λA = λ1. So Equation 28a is always true
if Equation 28b holds (under λA = λ1) i.e.
λ1p
∗
S
(
β1(1 − αII) + β2αEI
(1 − αII)(1 − αEE) − αIEαEI
)
< 1 (29)
As λ1 is the largest eigenvalue both algebraically and in magnitude, under Equation 29,
1 − αIIαEE + αIEαEI − p∗SλA(β1αII − β2αEI)
> 1 − αIIαEE + αIEαEI −
(
(1 − αII)(1 − αEE) − αIEαEI
β1(1 − αII) + β2αEI
)
(β1αII − β2αEI)
=
(
(1 − αII)2 + αIEαEI
)
β1 + αEI(2 − αII − αEE)β2
(1 − αII)β1 + αEIβ2
> 0
∴ Equation 27a is also true if Equation 29 holds. Thus the condition for the roots to be in (−1, 1)
when they are real is given simply by Equation 29.
r1 and r2 are complex In this case λA is such that D < 0. Also as Equation 25 has real co-
efficients, r1 and r2 are complex conjugate of each other and so |r1| = |r2| =
√
r1 · r2. But the
product of roots x1 and x2 of the equation ax2 + bx + c = 0 is equal to c/a. Hence we want to
enforce c/a < 1. In our case it is
αIIαEE − αIEαEI + p
∗
SλA(β1αII − β2αEI) < 1
which is exactly Equation 27a. From the above analysis, we already know that it is true if Equa-
tion 29 holds. So, for any eigenvalue λA for which D < 0, the roots have magnitude less than 1
given Equation 29 is true.
Thus in both cases, whether roots are real or complex, Equation 29 is a sufficient condition for
the roots to have magnitude less than 1.
To re-cap we state Theorem 1 and then give its proof:
Theorem (Super-model theorem - sufficient condition for stability). For virus propagation models
which statisfy our general initial assumptions and for any arbitrary undirected graph with adjacency
matrix A and largest eigenvalue λ1, the sufficient condition for stability is given by:
s < 1
where, s (the effective strength) is:
s = λ1 · C
and C is a constant dependent on the model (given by Equation 30). Hence, the tipping point is reached
when s = 1.
Proof Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 ensure cases C1 and C2 and hence together with Lemma 1 imply
that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian J of our general NLDS computed at the fixed point x˜ are less
than 1 in magnitude if Equation 29 is true.
∴ using Theorem 2, our general NLDS is stable at its fixed point x˜ if Equation 29 holds. Recall
that x˜ is the point when there no infected nodes in the system (Appendix C) and that this is the
fixed point whose stability conditions determine the epidemic threshold (Section 4).
∴ finally we can conclude Theorem 1 with
CVPM = p
∗
S
(
β1(1 − αII) + β2αEI
(1 − αII)(1 − αEE) − αIEαEI
)
(30)
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and the effective strength s = λ1 ·CVPM. The parameterCVPM is a constant for a given propagation
model while the only parameter involved from the underlying contact-network is λ1, the first
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.
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